

Women in the Labor Market and Experienced Political Institutions

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This version, August 2024

Abstract

In this paper, I first present a novel finding: women who have experienced democratic institutions during their impressionable years are more likely to participate in the labor market, while controlling for factors such as country, cohort, language and various other confounding factors. I then provide evidence suggesting that discriminatory attitudes may serve as a channel for this phenomenon. Other explanations receive less support from the data.

JEL codes: D72, J16, J71.

Keywords: gender economics, institutions, democratization, discrimination, labor supply.

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1 Introduction

The positive effects of good institutions cannot be overstated. North (1990) writes the following definition: "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction." One of the fundamental rules of the game in a society is whether the political system is democratic or autocratic. The democratic form of government is by definition linked to the possession of inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). One of the dimensions of the word "inclusiveness" is "gender inclusiveness."

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the positive consequences of inclusive institutions by showing how they favor female labor force participation by reducing discriminatory attitudes toward women. The ideal experiment for uncovering the relationship between democratization and female labor participation would consist of randomly varying the political regime of countries. Then, subsequently, comparing their female labor participation. Such an experiment is unfeasible.

A premise to comprehend the identification strategy of this paper is by observing the evolution of democratization in different countries, represented in Figure 1 and Figure 2, from the 1900s to 2016. In the figures, I consider Egypt, Spain, Afghanistan, and Syria. I consider two indicators of how democratic the institutions are. The first one is the polity score, and the second one is the extent to which there are constraints on the executive. These series exhibit both cross-sectional and time variation.

The series show that different cohorts of people will be exposed to a different degree of democratization throughout their life. For instance, people born in the 1920s in Spain experience similar democratization rates in their 20s as those born in the 1990s but different crime rates than those born in the 1940s. One can repeat a similar exercise across time and space for every country that had some relevant regime transitions.

The main idea of the empirical strategy of this paper is exploiting such variation for identification purposes to alleviate the concerns arising from purely cross-sectional comparisons. There is a hypothesis in experimental psychology that has received considerable empirical support, according to which people between about 16 and 25 years old tend to be more impressionable, and experiences lived during those ages tend to persist for a long period of time (Krosnick and Alwin , 1989).

Therefore, it is possible to link the regime to which people were exposed during one of their impressionable years, say, 18 years old, to data coming from the World Value Survey to compute whether democratization matters for labor market outcomes. Data from Syria start in 1940. A related idea has been used by economists to identify, for instance, the effect of recessions on preferences for stock market participation (Malmendier and Nagel , 2011).

The starting point of this paper is the observation that female labor supply responds to the experienced level of democratization. I find that in the most demanding specification, a standard deviation increase in the polity score at 18 years old makes female labor participation higher by 2.6 percent of its mean; a standard deviation increase in the constraints of the executive variable increases female labor supply by 3.7 percent of its mean.

In order to shed more light on the channels through which this happens, I look at whether attitudes toward women respond to the democratization level experienced during adolescence. I first consider the answers to the World Value Survey question: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” I observe that people who experienced democracy while they were aged 18 years old are more likely to respond negatively to such a question.

Having established that attitudes may be a channel for such a response, I look at which kind of attitudes may matter. I first consider discriminatory attitudes toward women and discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants (regardless of gender), and I find evidence that those attitudes respond strongly to the type of institutions experienced during impressionable

years. Another channel may be that people who experienced inclusive institutions may be less conservative toward women in the workplace. However, when I look at conservative attitudes toward women in the workplace, I find that those attitudes are not responsive to the experienced institutions during adolescence.

Motivated by the fact that some respondents may be concerned that the inclusion of women in the workforce may push away the older people, I also look at attitudes toward seniority, and I find that those attitudes are not responsive to the experienced institutions during adolescence.

Another possibility may be that people who experienced inclusive institutions feel, in general, more proactive toward work. Therefore, I consider attitudes toward work, regardless of gender, but I find that also those attitudes are not responsive to the experienced political institutions during adolescence.

All in all, the body of evidence presented suggests that female labor participation is favored by having experienced inclusive political institutions, perhaps because people that have had those democratic experiences tend to behave inclusively themselves, by having fewer discriminatory attitudes.

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on the consequences of democratization. While there is a large literature on the macro-economic consequences of democratization, the one about micro-economic consequences (at the individual level) is much smaller. Democratization has been shown to matter for social capital, for instance by Muller and Seligson (1994) and Paxton (2002) and inequality (Mueller and Stratmann, 2003). By connecting female labor supply to political outcomes, the paper is connected to the literature focused on the relationship between female political representation (measured by female voting or the proportion of females in political power) and female labor force participation (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2007, 2006, Lv and Yang, 2018). Bayanpourtehrani and Sylwester (2013) consider first, in a cross-country analysis, and then

in a panel data study, the association between female labor participation and democratization, finding that labor force participation is higher in autocracies (and lower in democracies). While the existing literature is focused on the relationship between current democratization and female labor supply, I ask whether there is a persistent effect of experienced past levels of democratization on female labor supply, controlling for country fixed-effects and in a setting where omitted variables are likely attenuated compared to simple cross-sectional or time-series country variations.

Second, it contributes to the growing literature focused on estimating the economic effects of experienced events during impressionable years or, relatedly, during relevant years in adolescence (Kahn , 2010, Malmendier and Nagel , 2011, 2015, Roth and Wohlfart , 2016, Troiano , 2017). Economic conditions and inequality experiences experienced during impressionable years have been shown to matter for economic and financial decisions and preferences for redistribution. Experiencing violent crimes has been shown to matter for social capital and political behavior. Graduating in a recession has long lasting effect on an individual career.

Third, it contributes to the literature on the economic effect of attitudes (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales , 2006). Attitudes toward women have been shown to matter for the implementation of government programs intended to favor female labor participation such as maternal leave (Givati and Troiano , 2012) and for fertility decisions (Fernandez and Fogli , 2009). Tabellini (2008) and Tabellini (2010) suggest a mutual feedback between attitudes of civic culture and good political institutions.

It is also important to note that attitudes and culture in general have been shown to matter for female labor supply, both by using cross-sectional variation and time series variation, as highlighted by Fortin (2005) and Giavazzi, Schiantarelli and Serafinelli (2013).

Finally, it contributes to the vast literature focused on the causes of female labor supply. Summarizing the female supply literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Explanations for the increase in female labor supply of the last century include: the decrease in the gender gap

over the over 1950-1990 period that encouraged many women to join the workforce (Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan , 2015), the increasing use of oral contraceptives that decreased unwanted pregnancies (Goldin and Katz , 2002), technological innovation that reduced the time to do chores at home (Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu , 2004), more favorable attitudes toward working women (Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti , 2004, Burda, Hamermesh and Weil , 2007).

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I present the data. In Section 3 I describe the empirical strategy. In Section 4 I present our results. In Section 5 I conclude.

2 Data

2.1 Political Institutions Data

The data about how democratic a country is in a given year, from 1800 to 2016, come from the Polity IV project (Polity IV, 2017). The Polity IV is the fourth edition of the Polity project, whose main goal was to code the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis (Eckstein and Gurr , 1975).

There are two main measures about how democratic a country is that I use for the purpose of this study. The first one is the flagship measure: polity. The second one is the most commonly used measure of the series, the constraints on the executive measure.

The polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). It is the combination of two different measures, one about how democratic a country is, and another one about how autocratic a country is. The former measure gives weights to: (i) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; (ii) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive; (iii) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The latter measure

gives weights to: (i) sharp restriction or repression of competitive political participation; (ii) selection of chief executives within the political elite; (iii) exercise of power with few institutional constraints.

The constraints on the executive score ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). The variable refers to the extent to which the power of the chief executives can be constrained by any accountability groups. Accountability groups could include legislatures, as is typical in Western democracies, or people in the ruling party (in a one-party state), council of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, and, in many countries, a strong independent judiciary system. The main goal of the measure is therefore to pick up the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process (Polity IV, 2017).

The previously described two variables are arguably the most commonly used to measure democratic political institutions by political economy scholars, and among the very few that are available since the 1800s.¹ Because of the nature of the research design used in this paper, it is very important to have data about political institutions that span far back in time, to include survey respondents coming from as many generations as possible.

2.2 World Value Survey

I merge the information about political institutions, at 18 years old, to data coming from the World Values Survey. I adopt the integrated 1981-2022 World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. , 2022). I measure whether the female respondent works with the answer to the following question:

Employment status: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed

¹Another variable that has been commonly used to measure political institutions is the expropriation risk. However, the latter variable is available only starting in 1984, and this would significantly reduce the number of generations included in this study, and its power, because values and beliefs tend to change slowly.

The main question that has been used to measure labor market attitudes toward women in previous studies (see for instance Givati and Troiano (2012)) is the following:

Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

I measure discrimination toward women with the answers to the following two questions: “Do you agree with the following statement? University is more important for a boy than for a girl.” “Do you agree with the following statement? Men make better political leaders than women do.” As general measures of discrimination I also consider the answers to the following two questions, that deal specifically with discrimination toward foreigners, independently of the gender: “Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to local people.” “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? Immigrants.”

It should be noted that I consider attitudes toward immigrants but I do not focus on the immigrants as a group in this study. The main reason is that the question about whether the respondent is an immigrant or not has been asked in limited years in the World Value Survey. Limiting to the years where the question has been asked cuts the sample size by about 80 percent. Within the subset of years that the question has been asked, only about 2 percent of the respondents reports to be born in a country different from the one where the survey is being conducted: therefore I do not consider immigrants *per se* in this study, nor I exclude them from the study, without too much loss of generality.

I measure conservative attitudes toward women with whether the respondent agrees with the following two statements: “A woman has to have children to be fulfilled” and “Being a housewife just as fulfilling as working”. I measure whether people are concerned with seniority with the answers to the following question: “Do you agree with the following statement? When jobs scarce, older people should be forced to retire.” Finally, I measure attitudes to-

ward work in general, independently of gender, with whether the respondent agrees with the following question: “*Is work very important?*”.

I summarize the variables used in this paper in Table 1.

3 Empirical Strategy

In this section, I outline the approach to estimate the consequences of experiencing inclusive political institutions during adolescence.

The main idea of the empirical strategy is to associate to every respondent the measure of how democratic the political institutions were when they were aged 18 years old. Controlling for country fixed effects alleviates the time-invariant concerns arising from geography; controlling for year of the survey fixed effects alleviates the concerns for the space-invariant time-specific shocks. I also control for age fixed effects, and age interacted linearly with year of the survey fixed effects, to account for the fact that for instance people as they age tend to get more conservative. The baseline equation I estimate is the following:

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta P_{ic} + G_i + A_i + \phi_c + \phi_t + \phi_t * A + \epsilon_{ict} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ict} is the outcome of interest, α is the constant, P_{ic} is the political institution variable (when the survey respondent has 18 years old), G_i is the gender of the respondent, A_i are age fixed effects, ϕ_c are country fixed effects, are the year of the survey fixed effects, are the interactions between the years of the survey fixed effects and age (entered linearly), and ϵ_{ict} are robust standard errors clustered at the country level.

An identification threat could be the possibility that age matters differently in different countries. To account for this possibility I will always show, together with the baseline specification, a specification that adds the interaction between country fixed effects and age (entered linearly):

$$Y_{ict} = \alpha + \beta P_{ic} + G_i + A_i + \phi_c + \phi_t + \phi_t * A + \phi_c * A + \epsilon_{ict} \quad (2)$$

where are the interactions between the country fixed effects and age (entered linearly).

4 Main Results

In Table 2, I present the results of female labor supply. I find that in the most demanding specification, a standard deviation increase in the polity score at 18 years old makes female labor participation higher by 2.6 percent of its mean; a standard deviation increase in the constraints of the executive variable increases female labor supply by 3.7 percent of its mean. To uncover whether attitudes may have a role in explaining this fact, I look at whether the respondents think that if jobs are scarce, men should have priority compared to women. I present those results in Table 3. I find that an increase of a standard deviation in the constraints of the executive variable reduces the probability that the respondent thinks that men should have priority by about 1 percent of its mean.

Having established that attitudes may have a role in explaining this effect, I look at which kind of attitudes could matter. I look at four different kinds of attitudes: discriminatory attitudes; conservative attitudes; attitudes toward older workers; and attitudes toward work in general. I find evidence that discriminatory attitudes are those that seem to respond to the experienced institutions during adolescence.

I measure discriminatory attitudes with the answers to four questions. The first two are targeted specifically toward women and measure discrimination during education and in leadership positions. The latter two target immigrants, regardless of gender. I find that all the four measures are very responsive to the type of institutions experienced during adolescence. I present those results in Table 4 to Table 7. Specifically, I find that one standard deviation increase in the constraints of the executive measure makes the probability of thinking that a

university education is more important for a boy smaller by 1 percent of the mean, and that men make better political leaders smaller by 1.7 percent of the mean. Additionally, the same standard deviation increase reduces the probability of thinking that when jobs are scarce, priority should be given to locals by 1 percent of the mean.

A possibility is that people who experience inclusive institutions are more progressive, and therefore more prone to accept working women. To test this hypothesis, I measure conservative attitudes toward women with whether the respondents think that women need children to be fulfilled, and whether the respondents think that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working regularly. I present those results in Table 8 and Table 9. I find that none of these attitudes are affected by the experienced institutions during adolescence: coefficients are typically small and statistically insignificant. Another possibility is whether the respondents are concerned with increased labor force participation because it would push the more senior people out of the labor force. In order to shed light on this hypothesis, I consider whether the respondents think that when there is job scarcity, older people should be forced to retire. I present those results in Table 10. I find that the responses to this question are not affected by the experienced political institutions during adolescence. Finally, I consider in Table 11 the possibility that attitudes toward work, in general, are affected by the type of political institutions during adolescence, finding no evidence of that.

4.1 Robustness Tests

So far, I have provided evidence supporting the fact that exposure to democratic institutions during the “impressionable years” increases female labor supply. A legitimate concern is whether I might be spuriously capturing a related effect, such as the impact of exposure to democratic institutions at birth or during adulthood.

To address this concern, I conduct a test to verify the plausibility of my empirical model.

Following the labor economics literature, including Case and Paxson (2010) and Hamermesh (2012), I run a “horse race” regression among three different models. In my case, the models are: the impressionable years model, a model in which democratization at birth affects female labor supply, and a third model where democratization at 30 years old matters. In Table 12 and Table 13, I show that for all the positive outcomes presented, the effects are driven by democratization during the impressionable years.” There are, however, two exceptions out of eight regressions: for the “University” outcome studied with the “polity” explanatory variable, all three coefficients of the alternative models lose their statistical significance, making it impossible to determine the best model. For the same outcome, “University,” studied with the “constraints on the executive” explanatory variable, both the “impressionable years” model and the “democracy at birth” model show statistical significance. Therefore, in all specifications but one, democratization during the impressionable years significantly affects the outcome even when controlling for alternative models, supporting the original specification of the paper.

5 Conclusion

Inclusive institutions matter positively for a number of macroeconomic outcomes. Despite this, the microeconomic consequences of inclusive institutions are largely neglected by the existing literature but are an exciting field of research. In this paper, I considered the effect of the exposure to inclusive institutions during the impressionable years on female labor supply, finding evidence that democratization makes female participation in the labor market easier.


I investigated the channels through which democratization influences societal attitudes, finding evidence that supports the view that democratization lowers discriminatory attitudes toward women and immigrants. Other potential explanations, such as changes in conservatism or attitudes toward the elderly, receive less support from the data. I then consider

and rule out alternative models for the effect of democracy on female labor participation, providing additional evidence for the “impressionable years hypothesis,” and ruling out the possibility that democracy at birth or adulthood is the crucial factor.

My findings raise several questions for further research. First, while the debate in economics has primarily focused on whether democracy increases growth and thus affects economic efficiency, my results suggest that democracy also has implications for equity. Comprehending the full range of diversity, equity, and inclusion implications of democracy, as opposed to autocracy, is an exciting direction for future research. Second, my results link gender-based discrimination in the labor market to democratic institutions. Future research could explore the broader implications of political institutions on various forms of discrimination. Finally, my results show that inclusive political institutions increase societal acceptance of gender-balanced Universities. Therefore, the findings of this paper support the view that one of the channels through which democracy affects economic growth is by increasing the contribution of women to the formal economy without necessarily diminishing that of men. Future research should further investigate the plausibility of this channel.


Figures

Figure 1: Polity score in selected countries



Notes: The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country).

Figure 2: Constraints in the Executive in selected countries



Notes: The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Works - Female	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00	162442
Priority Men	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00	302757
Univ. Imp. for Boys	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00	278470
Men Better Leaders	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	272802
Priority Local	0.71	0.45	0.00	1.00	288068
No Immigrants	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00	298961
Needs Children	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00	118383
Housewife Fulfilling	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00	286161
Old Should Retire	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	61,997
Polity Score 17 y.o.	2.33	7.21	-10.00	10.00	327712
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.	4.71	2.30	1.00	7.00	327712

Notes: *Works - Female* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employment status of a female respondent is the following: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed. *Priority Men* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” *University more Important for Boys* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “University is more important for a boy than for a girl.” *Men Better Leaders* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “Men make better political leaders than women do.” *Priority Local* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to local people.” *No Immigrants* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned “Immigrants” as an answer to the following question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” *Women Need Children to be Fulfilled* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the statement: “A woman has to have children to be fulfilled.” *Being Housewife just as Fulfilling* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: “Being a housewife just as fulfilling as working.” *Old Should Retire* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: “When jobs scarce, older people should be forced to retire.” *Working is Very Important* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned “very important” as an answer to the question “Is work very important?” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination).

Table 2: Effects of Political Experience on LFP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Works - Female	Works - Female	Works - Female	Works - Female
Polity Score 17 y.o.	0.00168* (0.0009)	0.00160* (0.0009)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			0.00734*** (0.0025)	0.00720*** (0.0025)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	162442	162442	162442	162442
R ²	0.226	0.227	0.226	0.227

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Works - Female* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employment status of a female respondent is the following: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed. The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 3: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Priority Men	Priority Men	Priority Men	Priority Men
Polity Score 17 y.o.	-0.00103** (0.0004)	-0.000939** (0.0004)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.00308*** (0.0011)	-0.00295*** (0.0010)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	302757	302757	302757	302757
R^2	0.228	0.229	0.228	0.229

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Priority Men* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 4: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Univ. Imp. for Boys	Univ. Imp. for Boys	Univ. Imp. for Boys	Univ. Imp. for Boys
Polity Score 17 y.o.	-0.00105*	-0.00102*		
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.00399**	-0.00404**
			(0.0018)	(0.0018)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	278470	278470	278470	278470
R ²	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *University more Important for Boys* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “University is more important for a boy than for a girl.” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 5: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Men Better Leaders	Men Better Leaders	Men Better Leaders	Men Better Leaders
Polity Score 17 y.o.	-0.00117** (0.0005)	-0.00110** (0.0005)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.00333** (0.0013)	-0.00336** (0.0013)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	272802	272802	272802	272802
R^2	0.208	0.209	0.208	0.209

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Men Better Leaders* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “Men make better political leaders than women do.” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 6: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Priority Local	Priority Local	Priority Local	Priority Local
Polity Score 17 y.o.	-0.00121** (0.0005)	-0.00123** (0.0005)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.00332** (0.0015)	-0.00330** (0.0015)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	288068	288068	288068	288068
R ²	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.151

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Priority Local* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, jobs should be given to local people.” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 7: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	No Immigrants	No Immigrants	No Immigrants	No Immigrants
Polity Score 17 y.o.	-0.000296 (0.0004)	-0.000369 (0.0004)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.00119 (0.0010)	-0.00139 (0.0010)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	298961	298961	298961	298961
R^2	0.131	0.133	0.131	0.133

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *No Immigrants* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned “Immigrants” as an answer to the following question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 8: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Needs Children	Needs Children	Needs Children	Needs Children
Polity Score 17 y.o.	-0.0000216 (0.0005)	-0.0000216 (0.0005)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.000809 (0.0016)	-0.000809 (0.0016)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	118383	118383	118383	118383
R^2	0.267	0.267	0.267	0.267

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Needs children* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the statement: “A woman has to have children to be fulfilled.” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 9: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Housewife Fulfilling	Housewife Fulfilling	Housewife Fulfilling	Housewife Fulfilling
Polity Score 17 y.o.	-0.000606 (0.0005)	-0.000561 (0.0005)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.00269** (0.0013)	-0.00259* (0.0013)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	286161	286161	286161	286161
R ²	0.097	0.097	0.097	0.097

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Housewife Fulfilling* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: “Being a housewife just as fulfilling as working.” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 10: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Old Should Retire	Old Should Retire	Old Should Retire	Old Should Retire
Polity Score 17 y.o.	-0.000753 (0.0008)	-0.000753 (0.0008)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.00152 (0.0027)	-0.00152 (0.0027)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	61997	61997	61997	61997
R^2	0.140	0.140	0.140	0.140

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Old Should Retire* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agreed with the following statement: “When jobs scarce, older people should be forced to retire.” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 11: Effects of Political Experience on Attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Work Very Important	Work Very Important	Work Very Important	Work Very Important
Polity Score 17 y.o.	0.000154 (0.0005)	0.000165 (0.0005)		
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.			-0.00132 (0.0013)	-0.00134 (0.0013)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	309286	309286	309286	309286
R^2	0.133	0.134	0.133	0.134

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Working is Very Important* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent mentioned “very important” as an answer to the question “Is work very important?” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country). The constraints on the executive score at seventeen years old ranges from 1 (unlimited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 12: Horse Race Robustness - Polity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Works - Female	Priority Men	Univ. Imp. for Boys	Men Better Leaders
Polity Score at birth	-0.000144 (0.0013)	-0.000785 (0.0005)	-0.000248 (0.0005)	-0.000769 (0.0005)
Polity Score 17 y.o.	0.00199* (0.0011)	-0.00113** (0.0005)	-0.00104 (0.0007)	-0.00196*** (0.0007)
Polity Score 30 y.o.	0.00111 (0.0012)	0.000394 (0.0007)	0.000241 (0.0007)	0.000386 (0.0006)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	129986	239377	112714	213768
R^2	0.227	0.238	0.111	0.212

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Works - Female* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employment status of a female respondent is the following: 1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed. *Priority Men* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” *University more Important for Boys* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “University is more important for a boy than for a girl.” *Men Better Leaders* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: “Men make better political leaders than women do.” The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country).

Table 13: Horse Race Robustness - Constraints on the Executive

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Works - Female	Priority Men	Univ. Imp. for Boys	Men Better Leaders
Constraints on the Executive at birth	0.00109 (0.0032)	-0.00151 (0.0011)	-0.00334** (0.0015)	-0.00248* (0.0014)
Constraints on the Executive 17 y.o.	0.00962*** (0.0028)	-0.00318** (0.0015)	-0.00573** (0.0026)	-0.00562** (0.0021)
Constraints on the Executive 30 y.o.	0.00530 (0.0037)	0.00109 (0.0022)	-0.000920 (0.0024)	0.00126 (0.0019)
Age Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CountryFE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mode of interview FE X Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Survey X Mode of interview	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	129986	239377	218396	213768
R^2	0.227	0.238	0.113	0.212

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: *Works - Female* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employment status of a female respondent is the following:

1. Full Time; 2. Part Time; 3. Self Employed.
- Priority Men* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." *University more Important for Boys* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: "University is more important for a boy than for a girl." *Men Better Leaders* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the following statement: "Men make better political leaders than women do." The polity score at seventeen years old ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic country) to +10 (strongly democratic country).

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